# Exhibit B

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P4GBROUC
      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      IRA BROUS, on behalf of
      themselves and all others
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      similarly situated,
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                     Plaintiffs,
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                                             24 Civ. 1260 (ER)
                v.
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      ELIGO ENERGY, LLC, et al,
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                    Defendants.
                                              Teleconference
      -----x
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                                              New York, N.Y.
                                              April 16, 2025
10
                                              2:30 p.m.
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     Before:
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                           HON. EDGARDO RAMOS,
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                                              District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
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      WITTELS McINTURFF PALIKOVIC
          Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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     BY: J. BURKETT McINTURFF
18
      FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
          Attorneys for Plaintiffs
19
     BY: DANIEL J. MARTIN
20
      WATSTEIN TEREPKA, LLP
          Attorneys for Defendants
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     BY: DAVID MEADOWS
          LEO P. O'TOOLE
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(Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your name for the record starting with counsel for Brous.

MR. McINTURFF: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is
Burkett McInturff from Wittels McInturff Palikovic on behalf of
plaintiff and the proposed class. I also have with me here my
colleague Dan Martin from Finkelstein Blankinship also on
behalf of plaintiff and the proposed class.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel for defendant.

MR. MEADOWS: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is David Meadows on behalf of the defendants joined by my colleague Leo O'Toole.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to you all. This matter is on for a conference. I note for the record this is being conducted by telephone. Because there is a little bit of history with this case, I want to admonish the attorneys to be concise in their responses to my questions, and to be as efficient as we can as we go through this hearing. There are several matters concerning discovery that the parties are disputing. They are set forth in Mr. McInturff's letter of March 21. I will take them one at a time. First of all, the issue concerning I believe it was non-New York market conditions contracts. Mr. McInturff, I'll hear you.

MR. McINTURFF: Yes, your Honor. This is Burkett McInturff. Your Honor, the amended complaint in this case

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pleads a proposed class that encompasses customers from outside of New York, and the claims at issue are both breach of contract and consumer protection claims. And it's well-settled that a plaintiff in our position is allowed to pursue discovery in pursuit of their Rule 23 showing. And now that discovery is underway and Eligo's begun producing documents and we've taken a 30(b)(6) deposition, we've identified four additional jurisdictions where we believe that customers in those jurisdictions can be included in a propose class where the named plaintiffs in this case can be the representatives.

And so understanding that we want to streamline the issues, we made a proposal to Eligo that we could minimize any additional discovery by just asking that they produce the same customer level data that they've agreed to provide for New So that's what the customers were charged and the basis of those charges. That's an electronic production which shouldn't be too burdensome. And then we ask that they also produce the ESI that they withheld solely because it did not touch on New York. If your Honor will recall when we had our very first conference in this case on May 9, 2024, it was on Eligo's premotion letter in advance of its first motion to dismiss. And the Court at that juncture allowed discovery to proceed, but only on behalf of New York customers because Eligo's anticipated motion at that time sought to remove to strike class allegations that extended beyond New York. And so

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the Court made a determination at that point prior to briefing on that motion the discovery was going to be limited to the New York customers. That determination was without prejudice.

We've since amended the complaint. We've engaged in discovery, and that discovery has lead us to believe that we can move forward with certification of a class that includes customers not just from New York, but also from the four additional jurisdictions mentioned in our letter, Washington, D.C., Illinois, Massachusetts and Maryland. We don't think that our request is particularly burdensome. In fact, Eligo's counsel agreed in writing to produce this discovery. But what they wanted in exchange, we didn't think was reasonable, and it's not reasonable. And the proffered exchange was that Eligo would produce the request of discovery if we stayed the actions that we also have pending on behalf of our clients who are in Pennsylvania and Ohio. But we couldn't agree to that because our pending class actions in Pennsylvania and Ohio are different cases.

In Pennsylvania it involves a different contract terms. The customers that are subject to the Pennsylvania-type contract are not going to be within this class, and we're not going to move to certify a class that includes customers that have the same type of Pennsylvania contract. The Ohio contract is a little tricker, and the issue really gets tied up in the two key issues that has actually brought us

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here to your Honor on this dispute, which is whether we can bring claims on behalf of customers from other states and the scope of the class we can certify.

So we're here in good faith -- and we've proposed a good faith solution to allow plaintiff the discovery we need to seek to certify the class we believe we can certify -- and to do so at minimal burden to defendant -- while we still have pending the issue defendant is disputing that we can bring the claims on behalf of customers in other states. And they're disputing that we can certify a class with the scope that we believe that discovery will allow us to certify. So our proposal here is there's minimal additional discovery. And then once we've moved for certification, and once the Court has weighed in on defendant's motion to strike and weighed in on the certification decision, we can decide what we'll do with the Ohio case.

The Pennsylvania case will always remain separate because it's a different contract, but that's our proposal. We think it's reasonable. We think it's consistent with Rule One. We're not trying to make anybody do any additional work, but we do need the discovery to certify the class. So that's our proposal, and we would hope that the Court will find it reasonable.

THE COURT: Mr. Meadows.

MR. MEADOWS: Thank you, your Honor. I'm afraid I

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differ with Mr. McInturff about the reasonableness of his proposal and the burden that it would impose on Eligo. And if I may, I want to give you a little bit of a background because I think it's going to cut through all of the issues that we're here to talk about today, and I'll be brief about it.

But Mr. McInturff is not quite correct in describing that discovery is merely underway, or that we are in the process of producing documents. In fact, discovery is almost over. We are on the eve of depositions in this case, which have to be concluded under the existing schedule order by the And in fact, we have completed our document end of May. production. Now that's very important because that has been a very expensive and arduous process, which was the result of extensive negotiations between us and Mr. McInturff and his colleagues. That process included a very lengthy exchange of search terms, which we repeatedly ran against our ESI database, gave the other side hit reports. And I think there were nine separate hit reports provided, or at least nine iterations of the search terms, which resulted in a total review database of 214,000 documents, which we have now at great cost reviewed and produced the relevant documents.

Now, it is only at the very end of that process that plaintiff's counsel has said -- and I don't mean to be overly casual about this -- but have said essentially, oh, by the way, we would now like to open discovery to other states, other

jurisdictions, other than New York, even though you, your Honor, expressly limited discovery to the New York issues almost a full year ago. And so we would submit that it's just at this point in the case, it is far too late to revisit that order now, and to drastically revise the scope of discovery after we have produced all our documents and as we are getting ready for depositions. So that's that a practical point, and we think is reason enough to deny this request.

But substantively, the request also rest on a very false premise. And if you read in plaintiff's letter, the gist of their argument is that Eligo's contracts in New York are essentially the same as those in the other jurisdictions where it now wants to engage in discovery, which I believe is Maryland, Washington, D.C., and there are two other states. They even go so far as to call these contracts standard form standardized contracts, and that's not true. As they admit elsewhere in their letter, there are substantive differences between these contracts from state to state. And just as one high-level example, the New York contracts to which the named plaintiffs are parties with us, identify four variable pricing factors.

Where in some of the other states where Eligo does business and where plaintiffs now want to seek discovery, there are ten factors, or maybe even more than that in some cases.

And those factors differ from state to state and geography to

geography because they consider things like weather patterns and other things that naturally differ from region to region. So the motion rests on a false premise. It seeks to undue an order that you entered over a year ago and on which everyone has relied, certainly Eligo has relied in fashioning the scope of discovery in making its document production. And we submit that it's simply inefficient, disproportionate and way too late to revise that now.

THE COURT: That first request by Brous is denied.

The next issue concerns the so-called limited renewal of plaintiff's motion for consumer protection discovery.

Mr. McInturff, I'll hear you.

MR. McINTURFF: Yes, your Honor. So the complaint at issue in this case includes consumer protection claims, and we had requested in a prior letter, we teed up the issue that defendant was refusing to provide customer complaints. And your Honor raised that issue at the last conference. My colleague Mr. Blankinship said on the record that we were reserving our rights with respect to any outstanding issues. He didn't appreciate, and we didn't appreciate, at the time that the Court was thereafter going to terminate the pending motions. We promptly reraised the issue with the defendant. We even narrowed the request at this point to a narrower set. All we're asking for is any complaint repository that were maintained in the ordinary course, and that Eligo not withhold

any complaints that crop up in the ESI that's subject to the order.

claims about where we are in discovery. They just finish producing their first round of documents. We still have -- the motion to dismiss is outstanding. There's still the motion to substitute the named plaintiff. One of the named plaintiffs is outstanding, so we don't agree that discovery is over in this case. We consider the case to be sort of in the middle of the case, and we don't think that producing complaint repositories that are maintained in the ordinary course or withholding complaints or producing complaints that have been withheld in the ESI that's the subject of the current review. We think that's very reasonable. As we said in our letter, consumer complaints and consumer protection matters are a routine part of discovery.

I know in your Honor's New York V. Penn Higher

Education case, your Honor held that complaints were relevant
to the New York Attorney General's claim that a student loan
servicer committed deceptive practices. That same case
involved claims under New York's GBL 349 just like this case.
So the rationale that this Court adopted in the New York v.

Penn Higher Education case applies. Customer complaints are a
standard part of any consumer protection case, and we didn't
wait too long to raise this issue. This case is conflicts

litigation. Eligo has waited longer on other discovery issues in this case, and we raised this issue with Eligo a month after your Honor raised it at the February 7 conference. Thereafter we had a meet and confer, and we filed our papers promptly.

In the interim period, we had to respond to a motion that Eligo filed on March 12th, but we haven't been delaying, and our request here is reasonable and proportionate, because we do have consumer protection claim that Eligo has not moved to dismiss. Those are live claims, and the complaint related discovery goes to those claims.

THE COURT: Mr. Meadows.

MR. MEADOWS: Thank you, your Honor. I think this is a very similar issue to the first, because here the plaintiffs are again asking you to not only undue an order that you entered about six weeks ago I believe, but also would have the net effect — if you granted it — would have the effect of again undoing our very carefully negotiated agreements on ESI and discovery. And in particular, the consumer protection documents that plaintiff are asking you to grant them access to today were the subject of a prior discovery letter motion that they filed, in particular document 69 on the docket.

Now the last time we were before you on a discovery letter motion -- and as you know the letter motion practice has been extensive in this case, you ask the parties point blank, look, there's a number of letter motions on the docket that

haven't ruled on. I want to know which of these are still alive, which need my attention. And Mr. McInturff's colleague Mr. Blankinship at that hearing told you, and I quote from the hearing transcript, "I don't think there are any outstanding issues. I think we've worked through those amongst ourselves or moved passed them." Now based on that representation and not long after that February 7 hearing, you entered an order, I believe it's docket 164, terminating I believe it was eight or nine separate letter motions, including the letter motion that related to these consumer protection materials that we're here again talking about today.

Now if plaintiff's counsel either misspoke or told you that they had moved pass an issue that they actually hadn't moved pass, I think it was incumbent on them to say something about that a lot sooner than they have. Because, again, that representation was made at a hearing on February 7th. Here we are today in mid-April where they're asking you to go back and undo an order in which terminated that motion. Again, it's just way too late to do that. And it's especially way too late because we not only finalized the search term negotiation, but completed our production. And they're now asking us to go back, not only undo the order, but go back and reopen our document production, reopen our review, to give them documents that were requested in a motion that has been denied six or seven weeks ago. It's unreasonable on its face, and for those

reasons we would ask you to deny this.

THE COURT: Plaintiff I'll give you 60 seconds, Mr. McInturff.

MR. McINTURFF: Yes, your Honor. Mr. Meadows left out the quote from the transcript where my colleague

Mr. Blankinship said, "To be candid, your Honor, I didn't anticipate that we were going to go back to discuss some of those prior issues, but reserving my right to do so. I don't think there are any outstanding issues I recall." Again, your Honor, this is basic consumer protection discovery that shouldn't be withheld. It's not burdensome, and we negotiated the discovery. We negotiated with the understanding that there were many issues still outstanding before the Court.

THE COURT: The request is denied. The next issue concerns should the Court direct Eligo to provide a hit report for its Slack collection. Mr. McInturff.

MR. McINTURFF: Yes, your Honor. Our request here is very straightforward. We just want a hit report. We haven't asked for anything. Eligo hasn't refused any request that we've made. We just want the hit report. The background here is, we had requested that Eligo collect Slack. They collected the Slack messages. As your Honor might recall, Slack is a collaboration platform that is different than email. They collected the Slack messages, but they didn't tell us they had done so. The Court had ordered that we pay for the Slack

collection, so we had no expectation they were going to collect it before we paid them. When we reached out to them and asked if they had made the collection with the expectation of paying, then they told us that they had already made the collection and they didn't tell us about it. Slack is a different animal than email.

We're not necessarily saying that anything has to be done at this point, but we were waiting for them to tell us when they collected Slack so that we could search it in the appropriate way. Because the way people talk, communicate on Slack is different than they do in email. I'll just add that since we filed our letter, there's been guidance from the Sedona conference that has come out that has reinforce that Slack may require different search terms because -- and I'm quoting -- "users often communicate much more informally on collaboration platforms than they do in emails; for example, therefore, the same search terms may not yield the intended result."

So what we're trying to do here now that we found out recently on March 6 that Eligo in fact had folded in the Slack communications into the ESI search, we just want a hit report to make sure that the search terms that were negotiated and agreed on are working properly on Slack. We haven't requested that they produce anything else. It's just the information

that we would have expected would have been provided once they uploaded the Slack ESI to their system and began searching it.

But for reasons we don't understand, Eligo decided not to notify us that they had done that, but we're asking for a hit report.

THE COURT: Can I ask you, putting aside the Sedona recent recommendation as such it is, nothing that you just mentioned about Slack arose the nature of it, the way people communicate, none of that arose over the last several weeks, did it, those observations?

MR. McINTURFF: No, your Honor. We didn't know that it had been collected until the last several weeks. That's the issue.

THE COURT: When you were putting together your proposed hit terms, you knew what Slack was and how it operated?

MR. McINTURFF: Correct, but we thought we were searching email. We thought we were searching email.

THE COURT: Mr. Meadows.

MR. MEADOWS: Thank you, your Honor. I think as you might already be suspecting, this request again would reopen our search term agreement and negotiation and expand it pretty considerably. Now, the supposed basis for that, that Mr. McInturff offered you, is that they didn't know or that we didn't disclose that the Slack collection was included in

database against which we were running the search terms as we negotiated them.

And I simply don't understand that because as you may recall this issue regarding Slack first came before you late last year. We had a November 7 conference, at which you ordered us to collect and produce documents from the Slack messaging system. And of course we obeyed your order. We went out and we collected the documents, and we put them in our review database. Now, as we went through the search term negotiation process -- again as I mention earlier, we extensively negotiated and communicated with plaintiffs' counsel. We shared the hit reports with them multiple times. They asked us questions about the results. There was an extensive back and forth.

Now, at no point did they ask us for a hit report from Slack. At no point did they ask us any specific question about Slack. And if they had, we would have answered them. And I submit to you that it was obvious that we were including Slack in the documents we were searching both because the numbers were enormous. The parties had to work very hard to get to a search term list that even got our review universe to 214,000 documents so we were obviously dealing with a huge amount of data, and all they had to do was ask. To ask now only after we had reached an agreement -- and by the way, our agreement on search terms is in writing. It is memorialized in email.

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To ask now to reopen this, I think once again it's far It's fundamentally unfair to my client, and it's too late. very much for the purpose of revising the search term agreement that plaintiff's counsel reached with us back in January of this year. As Mr. McInturff even said during his initial presentation, in his view I think Slack -- and I wrote it down, may require different search terms. It's way too late for that. And last point, very important to understand. From the defendant's perspective in the search term negotiation, we were obviously very concerned with the overall burden and cost of the review. And so our chief negotiating goal, which we made very clear to plaintiffs counsel was, we needed to get to an overall number of documents in our review database that we considered to be reasonable and proportional, and that number was going to be in the low 200,000.

Plaintiff counsel agreed to that. They now want to expand it over that number. By how much, remains to be seen. But this whole Slack hit report is for the purpose of revising the search term agreement and making us search more ESI than we ever agreed to search and more ESI than the plaintiffs agreed that we should have to search.

THE COURT: Mr. McInturff, 60 seconds.

MR. McINTURFF: Yes, your Honor. Discovery is an iterative process. Discovery is not one and done. And the case law is very clear that search terms require testing and

careful planning. The idea that defendant uploaded a bunch of documents from a different type of communication systems that requires a different type of search term, the idea that we're somehow bound is not appropriate. More importantly, we're not necessarily asking for any changes. We want the information to see if our search terms work on this other communication platform. The case in the Southern District is clear that ESI should be a transparent process that involves corroboration. It's not gotcha. It's not surprise. This was a big surprise to us. Again, we haven't asked for any remedial measures yet. We just want information. It would take them less time than this call to produce a hit report.

THE COURT: Mr. McInturff, I'm really trying to figure out what difference it makes, because I remember the discussion concerning Slack. I remember that Eligo did not want to produce ESI from Slack. They wanted to just limit it to, email as I recall. And I said you can't sort of arbitrarily limit an entire, or carve out an entire mode of communication. If I recall they weren't very happy with my decision in that regard, although they weren't in front of me, it was fairly obvious. I don't know what difference it would have made in terms of the search terms that are used. They're English. And although people may use abbreviations or less than full sentences, but they still use words. Those words would be the same over the various modes of communication.

And as Mr. Meadows indicated, the parties apparently agreed to a universe of a particular number of hits. You've reached that number. I don't know what difference it makes.

MR. McINTURFF: Your Honor, that's why we're asking for a hit report. We can see from the hit report. If I can read a little bit more of this briefing from Sedona that came out in April. It says, "It is necessary to understand what abbreviations, acronyms, shorthand, and slang are likely to be used by the communications in the specific matter." We can't be sure what the effect of using email only search terms on a different platform is until we can see the effect of those email only search terms are on that platform. We're just trying to get the information to see what the effect was.

If we believe something is necessary to be done, we'll raise it with defendants. And if we can't agree, we'll raise it with your Honor. We're not even at the point of being able to say that the email search term worked or didn't work because we can't see the results from the hit report.

THE COURT: Okay. That application is denied. I do note that there is a letter that was submitted by plaintiffs on April 14 concerning another apparently related two issues of discovery. Mr. Meadows, I don't know whether you've had an opportunity to review or are prepared to address the issues in that April 14 letter?

MR. McINTURFF: Your Honor, if I could interrupt. I

apologize. There's still an issue left in the letter we're talking about from the 21st of March.

THE COURT: The video files?

MR. McINTURFF: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. McInturff, why don't you tell me what that is about.

MR. McINTURFF: So the issue here is standard ESI discovery practice. Video files and audio files can't be identified using search terms. You can't plug a search term into a system and pull up responsive or relevant video or audio files. So the parties initially in our original ESI proposal agreed that audio and video files would be searched for independently by counsel. We were unable to agree on an ESI protocol, and one wasn't entered. And we found out recently that what defendants did was is they, the only audio and video file that they have reviewed are audio and video files that were either attached to emails that hit on search terms; or where a search term hit on the file name.

Thus far they've produced, other than named plaintiff call recordings, they've produced two substantive audio video files. One is sort of a recording training session, and one is a video training session. It's very helpful discovery saying a picture is worth a thousand words. These are very likely to be trial exhibits. These audio videos are used in the ordinary course, and Eligo's search for them is not reasonable. It's

not consistent with standard practice, and it doesn't represent a reasonable search under Rule 26 (G). What we've asked them is, their 30(b)(6) testified that Eligo has accessible video recording that are kept in a location that are for training. So we ask counsel to identify those and produce any video recordings that are responsive. Again, they've already produced one training document. It's very informative.

And then we also ask that defense counsel interview the key Eligo personnel and ask that they identify any other video or audio files that are potentially responsive to our discovery request. That's ordinary discovery practices. And the idea that only search terms could be used to identify audio and video files, frankly it's just an inadequate search. We're asking that your Honor direct Eligo to perform a reasonable search.

THE COURT: Can I ask, so the video files and audio files that you are asking for or that you are referring to are all internal Eligo training material; is that it? Is that accurate?

MR. McINTURFF: The 30(b)(6) witness testified that there is a repository video recording that are "in the training context." There may be other video recordings we don't know about. But what we're asking is, is that counsel perform a reasonable search. I could see that there may be video recordings about specific rate setting decisions that aren't

necessarily training, per se, but certainly the training documents would be the low hanging fruit.

THE COURT: And how many of these have you received, just one I think you said in your letter?

MR. McINTURFF: We've received one. After our letter, Eligo made a subsequent production and we received one additional.

THE COURT: So you have two videos?

MR. McINTURFF: We have one video that discusses
Eligo's training and hedging strategies. And then we have one
recording that we're still trying to get to the bottom of. We
know what it's discussing, but it's not clear if it's Eligo
because it's discussing gas sales in New York. And counsel has
repeatedly represented that Eligo didn't sell gas in New York.

THE COURT: Is that a video or audio recording?

MR. McINTURFF: That's an audio file.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Meadow?

MR. MEADOWS: Thank you, your Honor. It's simply not true that we haven't done an adequate search. Our search for responsive documents has encompassed multiple databases and hundreds of thousands of documents. In many, many cases search terms are sufficient to identify responsive audio and video files because they might be attached to emails. They might be attached to other documents that hit on the search terms that indicate that those attachments are potentially relevant.

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When we have encountered those in our review, we have actually listened to the audio files or watch the video files as the case may be to determine if they're responsive. And one of the reasons why the plaintiffs have seen very relatively few audio and video files is that we have found the responsiveness rate is exceptionally low. It's just not the case that these files relate to the issues that are alive in this case which are essentially variable rate class setting. Eligo does many things other than that. There are many aspects of its business. And these videos by and large just don't relate to So it's not even clear to me what more exactly we would be ordered to do if you were to grant this request. But certainly we have not excluded any audio or video files from our review. We have reviews hundreds and thousands of And when we've come across these files, we've listened to them and watched them and we have produced what's responsive to the discovery requests.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this: Does Eligo have, lack of a better word, a library of videos or training materials that it stores somewhere if you know?

MR. MEADOWS: I'm not aware of a library of videos, certainly not a library of videos that would exist utterly apart from the other documents that we have collected, which are not just email or Slack, but all sorts of different databases, including the databases that Eligo actually uses to

set rates. So of course as part of a document collection of this size, I can't, your Honor, in good faith represent that there isn't some video out there or some audio file that we haven't collected, but that's always the case. And I'm not aware of any repository that we have not searched or made a reasonable effort to search.

THE COURT: Mr. McInturff.

MR. McINTURFF: Yes, your Honor. Eligo's 30(b)(6) witness testified that they had accessible video recordings that are kept in the ordinary course. And he specifically testified that they're "in the training context." So what I haven't heard defense counsel say is that they run that down or that they have interviewed custodians about potentially responsive audio or video files.

THE COURT: Make a determination whether or not they are consistent with the 30(b)(6) witness's deposition any additional training video, etc., that may not exist in the context of the searches that you've already conducted. And again, I don't know exactly what it was that this witness said, and I don't know whether that witness was involved in the document production. Although I assume he or she was, but to the extent that there is any other training areas or training function within Eligo that may have some of these videos, you should run that down and report back to Mr. McInturff.

MR. MEADOWS: Understood, your Honor. And with one

clarification if I may. I think we all understand that training is a very broad concept, and there may be training videos or audio files that have nothing to do with rate setting or anything else that's at issue here. With that understanding, we're certainly happy to go back and be double sure that anything that's potentially relevant, we will talk to our people and make sure we've covered.

THE COURT: Absolutely. I'm not suggesting that you turn over irrelevant materials.

MR. MEADOWS: Understood. Always helps to be extra clear. Thank you for indulging me on that.

THE COURT: Okay. We were talking about, I raise the issue of the April 14th letter. Mr. Meadows, I don't know if you had an opportunity to review or digest that request. So you tell me?

MR. MEADOWS: Thank you. I have not yet, your Honor. In fact, everything else going on in the case, I plan to ask you today for an extension on our time to respond to that letter. I believe currently, it may be Friday of this week, it would be a great help to us to have until Wednesday of next week to respond to that.

THE COURT: That application is granted. With that, unless there's anything else that we should discuss today, Mr. McInturff.

MR. McINTURFF: No, your Honor.

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                THE COURT: Mr. Meadows?
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                MR. MEADOWS: No, thank you, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: In that event, we're adjourned. Stay
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